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DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTICUT
CRIMINAL LAW: 2007
By

TIMOTHY

H.

EVERETT*

This article reviews some issues of procedural and substantive criminal law that arose in appellate cases decided by
the Connecticut Supreme and Appellate Courts in 2007. In
2007 the Connecticut Supreme Court decided a total of 47
criminal appeals, the vast majority of which were direct
appeals from judgment after criminal trials, with just a few
cases involving collateral review and other post-judgment
issues such as habeas corpus petitions, motions to correct an
illegal sentence, and new trial petitions. The Supreme Court
issued 36 full opinions and 11 per curiam opinions. The court
sat en banc seven times. 1 One of the en banc cases, State v.
Lawrence,2 generated the year's sole dissent and also one of
the year's two concurring opinions. 3 The Supreme Court
docket comprised 12 cases brought directly to the court, 10
cases transferred from the Appellate Court 4 and 25 cases in
Clinical Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141 (2007) (6-1 holding that state constitutional standard for proof of voluntariness of a confession is same as federal preponderance standard); State v. Casiano, 282 Conn. 614, 627-28 (2007) (indigent has
right to appointment of counsel for filing and appeal of a motion to correct sentence
that has a "sound basis"); State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 217-18 (2007) (affirmed
Appellate Court review of claim regarding state of mind exception to hearsay rule;
clarified standard of review on appeal of hearsay rulings, adopting neither abuse of
discretion nor de novo review, preferring a "more nuanced," context-sensitive
approach "driven by the specific nature of the claim"); State v. Davis, 283 Conn. 280
(2007) (rejected state constitutional argument for adopting pre-1980 federal "automatic standing" test for challenges to police searches); State v. Brewer, 283 Conn.
352, 360-61 (2007) (no clear violation of the Constitution where trial court gave
Connecticut's "acquittal first" jury charge relating to lesser included offenses as
requested by trial counsel, who "expressed his satisfaction with that instruction");
State v. Randolph, 284 Conn. 328 (2007) (consolidated trial at which trial judge
court erroneously instructed jury it could consider evidence from each case in the
other; common scheme or plan exception analyzed); State v. Britton, 283 Conn. 598
(2007) (custody not established to trigger Miranda protections; Golding review
denied to claim that court should not have read charge on aggravating factor for capital charge to jurors during voir dire).
2
2282 Conn. 141 (2007).
3
Justice Palmer joined the majority opinion in Lawrence but wrote a brief
concurrence. Id. at 184-85. Justice Katz dissented at length. Id. at 185-209.
4
Most of the transfers were initiated by the Supreme Court itself pursuant to
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199( c ) and PRACTICE BOOK § 65-l, but one case was transferred at the request of the Appellate Court after oral argument in that court; Mead
*
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:ourt certified issues for appeal following decision
ellate Court. In the certified appeals, the Supreme
med the Appellate Court decisions 19 times and
v times.
the Appellate Court decided 129 direct appeals in
ses and another 53 appeals of claims made for col,f stemming from criminal cases (primarily peti,rits of habeas corpus). Altogether there were 13
opinions and seven concurring (or partially coninions. The Appellate Court sat en banc only once,
Flanagan.5 In Flanagan, the court granted the
motion for reconsideration and reargument folrst, split decision by a regular three-judge panel
ie judgment. 6 In its en banc review, the court again
his time in a decision, split 5-4, rejecting the
claim that the trial court had violated his consti,ht of self-representation. 7 Chief Judge Flynn and
-rs (joined by Judges DiPentima and McLaughlin)
rited, with Flynn's opinion commencing with the
ing topic sentence of the season: "We are heirs of
it colonists who distrusted lawyers because so
the profession were aligned with King George."8
er, 282 Conn. 317, 318 n.l, 322 (2007); and one case was transferred
ie defendant; State v. Batts, 281 Conn. 682, 688 n.5 (2007). PRACTICE
,overns transfers by motion of a party before oral argument in the
rt and upon the Appellate Court's own filing "at any time before the
tion of an appeal" of a "statement of the reasons why transfer is
which the Supreme Court will "treat" and "promptly decide" as if it
to transfer.
)nn. App. 105 (2007), cert. granted (in part), 284 Conn. 922 (2007).
sue now before the Supreme Court is: "Did the Appellate Court prop,hat the trial court did not violate the defendant's right to self-repreusly, a split (2-1) regular panel of the court had reached the same
lge Dranginis (joined by Judge Bishop) authoring the majority opin-h Chief Judge Flynn dissented as to the self-representation issue.
an, 93 Conn. App. 458 (2006). The en banc panel reconsidered only
-ntation issue decided by the first panel, and its decision superseded
Flannmn 102 Cnnn Ann at 107 n 2innnn thni i'cm- nlnn
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ngly, the Supreme Court has granted certification
- split decision of the en banc court in Flanagan.9
zle attends to some of the more important appelecided in 2007 and also calls attention to cases
sues of continuing currency in criminal practice.
f the "cutting edge" criminal law issues from past
in so. For example, the Connecticut Supreme
-t to settle the issue left open in State v. Sawyer, 1O
-r the adoption of the Connecticut Code of
2000 removed or left intact the court's commonty to change rules of evidence." Connecticut
nue to grapple with novel applications of conclause doctrine based on the United States
)urt's paradigm-shifting decision in Crawford v.
12 in 2004.13 The state Supreme Court in State v.
ied the paradigmatic principles set forth in
New Jersey15 and held that the defendant had a
[dment right to have a jury decide the statutory
mandate an enhanced sentence for a persistent
16
ny offender.
d review of criminal appellate practice in 2007
ified issue is: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the
ot violate the defendant's right to self-representation?" Flanagan,
2007).
in. 331, n.l (2006). The issue may be resolved when the court
fled issue in State v. DeJesus, 91 Conn. App. 47 (2005), cert. grant12 (2006) ("'Does this court, or any court, have the authority in light
ut Code of Evidence, to reconsider the rule that the introduction of
conduct of the defendant in sexual assault cases, is viewed under a

?,"').
section, "Setting the Bounds for Evidentiary Review under the
lwyer," in last year's annual review. T.H. Everett, Developrments in
ninal Law: 2006, 81 CONN. B. J. 161, 171-75 (2007).
.36 (2004).

State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 (2007); State v. Stenner, 281 Conn.
tv. Ramirez, 101 Conn. App. 283, 287-94 (2007) (Crawforderror but
a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 283 Conn. 909 (2007), cert. denied,

:008): State v. Torelli. 103 Conn. App. 646. 657-58 (2007).
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ncomplete without mention of personnel changes
reme Court. Appellate Court Judge Chase Rogers
in as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice
len reached the age of mandatory retirement from
rue Court, and Appellate Court Judge Barry
/as appointed to the Supreme Court. Justice
-tirement bears special recognition. Justice Borden
i justice on the Supreme Court from 1990 until
)rior to that served as an original member of the
-ourt from the time it was constituted as a constiJrt in 1983. In his last year on the Supreme Court,
den continued his career-long drive to clarify legal
Ften doctrine articulated with less than ideal precivious cases. 17 Borden's intellectually keen presen a "given" on the appellate scene in Connecticut
that the vast majority of criminal lawyers have no
that pre-dates his elevation from the Superior
;ome of us are surprised to find no textual support
imption that the Constitution requires his presence
iing court. 18 Thankfully, like other retired justices
reme Court, Borden now sits on panels of the
-ourt deciding cases and clarifying legal doctrine
opriate. 19
appellate judge over the last quarter century, Borden has relentlessly
iculation of a more consistent, functional, and reasonable body of
loctrine, by disentangling inconsistencies in received doctrine and by
ormal nature of a given legal rule, often aided by a functional analy,rlying purpose of the rule. For example, in State v. Randolph, 284
-68 (2007), Justice Borden writing for the court seized "this opporze carefully our jurisprudence concerning the admissibility of eviarged misconduct offered to establish the existence of a common
in nonsex crime cases, and to clarify the principles that govern our
342. Randolph typifies the depth of analysis for which Borden is
tingly, even in this particular subset of evidentiary law, Borden has a
ing for the factors that most accurately reflect the proper and improparged misconduct evidence in a criminal case. See State v. Mooney,
125-32 (1991); State Morrell, 7 Conn. App. 75 (1986).
the text of the state constitution does not mention him bv name, it is
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I. POLICE INVESTIGATIONS:
-SSIONS AND SEARCH AND SEIZURE DOCTRINE

rig courts in 2007 decided confessions cases
ue process, Miranda, and right to counsel con-

police interrogation of criminal suspects and
In the leading due process case, State v.
the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
tat his confession to ownership of cocaine seized
'e during a search of his home was coerced from
olice threat to have the Department of Children
s remove his children and grandchildren from his
s he confessed. 2 1 Justice Borden wrote the opinourt, rejecting the defendant's argument that his
was inadmissible under the federal constitution
rig the trial court's conclusion that the state had
a preponderance of evidence that the defendant
oluntarily despite the defendant's insistence in his
it the suppression hearing that the police had
lim. 2 2 On appeal the defendant's second constituient was that the court should overrule its decade, in State v. James,2 3 in which the court had held
e constitutional standard for establishing the vol)f confessions is the same as the federal preponidard. 24 The court rejected the defendant's invitarule James and to adopt a state constitutional rule
)f the court, written by him, in which the court overstepped those
)t think that this court should.., be in the business of drafting spe;for trial courts. We do our appellatejob better by doing what we
imely, reviewing instructions given by trial courts in the context of
,id deciding whether they meet the specific legal challengepresent... In this connection, I acknowledge that this court, in an opinion
for the court, did draft specific instruction language in State v.
Eonn. 534, 579-80, 881 A.2d 290 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1798, 164 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2005). In hindsight, I think that this was
proven to be so by the fact that, immediately upon the release of
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have required the government to prove voluntariida reasonable doubt.25
Katz dissented in Lawrence on the state constitudeclaring that the stare decisis strength of
27
to
Id not withstand the "'lessons of experience'
from numerous instances of exoneration of perNA evidence and by other means, many of which
28
)utable to false confessions and police coercion.
ed out that the underlying concern in modern feditutional voluntariness doctrine is to determine
confession was coerced, but that the singular concoercion represents a narrowing of purpose from
-deral doctrine which also represented "the notion
irpose of a voluntariness hearing was to enhance
lity of jury verdicts." 29 In a brief concurrence in
joined the majority opinion, Justice Palmer
trong reasons why the legislature would be wellchange the law governing police interrogation in
-t, especially when a suspect is young or suffers
ntal disability:
eparately wrote only to underscore that, to the extent
confessions have led to a number of wrongful conie, 2 6

158-77.

185-209.
187 (quoting from Justice Brandeis's dissent in Burnet v. Coronado
,.,285 U.S. 393, 406-10 (1932), part of which declares, "[1n cases
Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is
)ossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court
;sons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that
trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also
function." Id. at 406-07).
Katz wrote: "Recent studies demonstrating the significant role of
involuntary and false confessions in wrongful convictions in this
le compelling evidence that our conclusion in James as to the admisFessions fails to promote just verdicts. Therefore, stare decisis should
ir decision in this case." Lawrence, 282 Conn. at 188. Justice Katz
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cross the United States, our legislature is free to
slation requiring police to videotape confessions
it is reasonably feasible to do so. Although valid
tay exist not to impose such a requirement on the
:re can be little doubt that recording confessions
imatically reduce, if not eliminate, any possible
of an erroneous conviction predicated on an involnfession. Indeed, videotaping confessions would
I both the trial court and the jury in evaluating the
ess and, ultimately, the reliability, of those confesalmer agreed with Justice Katz that "the risk of a
ion is appreciably greater in cases of juveniles and
i mental disabilities." 31 Because such persons are
vulnerable to police overreaching" and may be
y than others to confess falsely" even without
ion, Palmer declared that "videotaping confessions
ons would serve an especially salutary purpose."3 2
,. Britton,3 3 an en banc Supreme Court upheld the
determination that the defendant's statements to
[the absence of Miranda warnings were admissi'ecause he was not in custody when he remained
nd state police at the New London police departestioning after he had voluntarily gone there at
:f police so that they could take his palm prints.
e Court noted that the defendant contested only
iclusion of the trial court, not the facts found by
rt at the suppression hearing, including that the
,atedly" told the defendant ("suspect") that he
der arrest and was free to leave. 34 In State v.
ie Supreme Court concluded that the trial court

n. 598 (2007).
3-05. The defendant's argument on anneal was that the "trial cnurt
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Imitted into evidence the defendant's inculpatory
-nade in an Arizona jail in the absence of counsel
sit from a Connecticut detective and an inspector
state's attorney's office after they informed the
that the state had obtained a warrant for his arrest
and showed him a copy of the warrant. 36 On
defendant conceded that his federal Sixth
-it right to counsel was not triggered by the
f the warrant, 37 but argued that his state constituto counsel had been triggered. The Stenner court
Lhe defendant's claim, holding that under
it law the right to counsel "is triggered at the same
e right to counsel afforded by the sixth amendamely when adversary judicial criminal proceedly begin with the defendant's arraignment in court
38
nformation.
? v. Edman, 39 the Supreme Court affirmed the
Court's 2005 decision reversing the defendant's
,onvictions on the grounds that the judge who
arch warrant for the defendant's home had a peronship with the defendant that prevented him from
ie federal and state constitutional requirements that
-issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. 40 In
Itts, 4 1 the Supreme Court held that the trial court
enied the defendant's claim that the police acted
)ly in approaching his already stopped car to con;pel an officer's suspicion that the defendant was
ile his license was suspended, discerned the smell
ia, asked for and obtained the defendant's marijua758-59.
758 n. 19. The defendant's concession regarding any federal constitu,as necessitated by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in State v.
nn. 42, cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2873 (2006). The Stenner court noted
e briefing and analysis using the factors set forth in State v. Geisler,
!. 684-86 (1992). gave the court the opportunitv to decide the state
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n arrested him. 4 2 Further, the court rejected the

claim that the arresting officer's suppression hearay and representations in an affidavit in support of
) search the defendant's apartment after his arrest
iently inconsistent so as to require an evidentiary
Ler the Franks exception to the rule that a warrant's
) be determined by reviewing the "four corners" of
without taking extrinsic evidence. 4 3 The court also
four corners review and found no error. 44
v. Davis,4 5 the Supreme Court sitting en banc

y rejected the defendant's claim that the state
embraces the "automatic standing rule" that once
Fourth Amendment doctrine but was put aside by
States Supreme Court in recognition that the doc,nmons v. United States4 6 makes the automatic
ile unnecessary. 47 For the court Justice Palmer
'sler factorial analysis and concluded that none
of
48
position.
defendant's
the
der factors favored
v. Browne,49 the Appellate Court in a split decision
the defendant's motion to suppress should have
d because the evidence seized by warrant was not
g the items for which the warrant gave authority to
majority opinion, written by Judge Berdon, found
arity requirement of the Fourth Amendment wartee was violated because the warrant listed cocaine
but not marijuana. The supporting application for
named only marijuana and the police intended
rch for marijuana. The majority declared: "This
i its face, simply did not describe the property
36,690, 692-94.
)4-99. Franks refers to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The
ined to revisit its decision in State v. Glenn, 251 Conn. 567 (1999),
Pranks standard as a matter of state constitutional law." Batts, 281
.7.
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I we hold that it is invalid." 50 The police officer

d the warrant application testified that he did so by
ising the "cut and paste" function, taking language
ext of a warrant in another case. 5 1 The majority
Lhe particularity requirement applies to the warrant
merely the supporting documents. 52 The majority
e state's alternate "plain view" argument because
were not legally on the premises that they searched,
he warrant was not supported by probable cause to
-ocaine and crack and it did not authorize a search
ana. Concluding his energetic dissent, 5 3 Judge
eclared: "To invalidate a warrant premised upon an
and affidavit that detailed the possession and sale
ia by the defendant but, due to typographical error,
referenced cocaine is the quintessential exaltation
,er substance and is inconsistent with a practical
of the particularity clause." 54 The Supreme Court
55
I certification to review.
v. Jenkins,56 a split panel of the Appellate Court
e trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, conhat the defendant was unlawfully detained, that his
search the vehicle was tainted by that illegal deten[at the state failed to purge the taint of the illegal
For those reasons, the evidence procured through
ant's consent should have been suppressed."5 7 As
is appellate counsel for the defendant and the case
rore the Supreme Court, it is not appropriate to
urther on the case.
18.
17 n. 3.
18-19.
21-45.

45.
)nn. 903 (2007) ("Whether the Appellate Court correctly determined
murt improperly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence
tto a search warrant?").
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II.

TRIAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
PLEA BARGAINING, TRIAL PROOF,

RY INSTRUCTIONS ON OFFENSES AND DEFENSES

)reme Court decided two cases of importance
ie law governing plea bargaining and the enforce?romises leading to bargained-for guilty pleas.
ner wrote both decisions. In State v. Rivers,58 the
nd the state entered into a written plea and coop-ement under which the defendant promised to
to kidnapping in the first degree and to cooperate
late in exchange for sentencing considerations.
under the agreement, the defendant gave a taped
the police and later testified consistently with that
t a probable cause hearing, which resulted in a
nurder against a co-defendant. At the co-defenthough, on advice of counsel, the defendant
Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify.
-clared the plea and cooperation agreement "null
nd charged the defendant with offenses, including
ler, that would have been barred under the terms of
-nt. The trial court denied the defendant's motion
which asserted that his performance under the
barred the state from using his police statement
bable cause hearing testimony at trial on the new
e trial court also denied a later motion to dismiss
d charges, which again hinged upon whether the
ad performed or breached his promises under the
The defendant then pleaded nolo contendere to the
*der charge, conditional on obtaining appellate
ne trial court's ruling denying his motion to disording de novo review to the denial of the motion
)and regarding the plea agreement as a contract
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defendant's waiver of fundamental constitutional
the Supreme Court noted that the state's "superior
power" means that it bore a special burden of clarg the terms of the agreement:
Ias the drafting party wielding disproportionate
ust memorialize any and all obligations for which it
defendant responsible, as well as all promises that
ade for the purpose of inducing the defendant to
The terms of the agreement should be stated cleariambiguously, so that the defendant, in assenting to
rtain fundamental rights, knows what is expected of
what he can expect in return. Likewise, such clarity
:hat the state knows what it may demand of the
t and what it is obligated to provide in exchange for
dant's cooperation.... Indeed, a majority of the feduit Courts of Appeals follow similar rules, constru6
guity in plea agreements against the government. '
te

)reme Court rejected the state's argument that the
eement contained an implicit promise to be a
Lt any trial"' because the written agreement only
the defendant's obligation to be truthful "'in the
defendant] becomes a witness"' and because "we

ue ambiguous language against the state[J"

6 2 The

rt reversed the judgment and remanded with an
,he defendant's motion to dismiss be granted and
r specific performance of the plea agreement. 63 In
ie court articulated a rule to govern agreements to
'onnecticut:
f the fundamental nature of an obligation to testify in
xt of a cooperation agreement, we expect and require
n the government intends for a cooperating defendant
, it will include such an explicit requirement in the
it.[Citation 64] Unless a plea agreement contains an
nclusions and resulting denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss is
ig State v. Haight, 279 Conn. 546, 550 (2006)).
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provision requiring that a defendant fulfill a substanation such as testifying, this court will not require the
it to do so. Likewise, the state may not claim retroacat a particular act or omission of a defendant constibreach of an agreement when the language65 of the
nt does not prohibit such an act or omission.
second plea bargaining case, Orcutt v. Commisie Supreme Court upheld a habeas court's order of
petitioner who established that he received a senviolated his "right to be sentenced in accordance
terms of his plea agreement as mandated by
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)."67 The court
the habeas court had properly held that the petientitled to a sentence that would fulfill "the actual
te parties to the plea agreement" as to the length of
[s actually to serve in prison, as it was a benefit for
defendant had bargained with the state in exchange
Ity plea. 68 While recognizing that a criminal defenmally expected to raise a Santobello claim on direct
)y way of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, 6 9
)und that the habeas court, in reaching the merits of
had impliedly found that the defendant had not prolefaulted; the court also found that the respondentfailure to seek articulation by the habeas court
he Supreme Court of an adequate record from
-onclude otherwise. 70 The Orcutt court did agree
-spondent, however, that the habeas court should
*ed that the petitioner be resentenced by the trial
-ad of resentencing the petitioner itself.
vent of the victim's death, it could have, and should have, said so. It
motely imply that this was its intent."), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 826,
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922, 111 S. Ct. 1315, 113 L. Ed. 2d 248
s, 283 Conn. at 730.
, 283 Conn. at 729-30.
3nn. 724 (2007).
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ireme Court decided -a number of cases that
'iewof constitutional and statutory challenges to
lent's burden of proof for particular offenses and
stice Katz wrote an important opinion in State v.
e in which the court analyzed the statute defining
ingerous felony offender liability as it is affected
i v. New Jersey,7 2 a seminal United States
)urt case 73 decided in 2000, which that court has
in later cases. 74 Applying Apprendi, the Bell
iat, absent waiver, a defendant has a right to have
he sentencing judge, make any findings that are
e legislature's prescription of an enhanced penalsistent dangerous felony offender under General
,tions 53a-40(b) and 53a-40(h). 75 Jurisprudenepresents our Supreme Court's first major appliin. 748 (2007).
. 466 (2000).
!court wrote: "the issue we must determine is whether the trial court
ates of Apprendi i New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progposed the sentence enhancement after its determination 'that [the
ory and character and the nature and circumstances of [his] crimicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best
interest.. .. ' General Statutes § 53a-40 (h)." The Bell court set forth
31ding: "'Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
ialty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
iry, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that exception, we
lowing rule] . . ."[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove
e assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties
nal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be
roof beyond a reasonable doubt."' Bell, 283 Conn. at 788 (quoting
J.S. at 490).
Katz's opinion reviews the major cases that have illuminated the
ixth Amendment jury guarantee in light of Apprendi. See Bell, 283
) (discusses "evolving legal landscape" post-Apprendi, including
,536 US. 584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004);
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); and Cunningham v. California, 549
3EN. STAT. § 53a-40(h) provides in pertinent part: "When any person
to be a persistent dangerous felony offender, and the court is of the
h person's history and characterand the nature and circumstances of
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-ie Apprendi line of cases. 76 Other Apprendi chalConnecticut practices and procedures 7 7 can be
icases involving other subsections of the pre-2008
offender statute and other statutes prescribing
78
penalties under prescribed certain conditions.
)pinion, however, provided a practical primer on
,islature may draft statutes constitutionally so as to
79
afoul of Apprendi and its progeny.
v. Heinemann,80 the court rejected the defendant's
he was entitled to have his jury instructed to contge,"specifically, the level of maturity, sense of
ity, vulnerability and personality traits of a sixteen
vhen it decided his defense of duress." After anae subjective and objective components of

it's statutory defense of duress 8 l and its Model
have been only a few cases so far in which Connecticut courts have
te scope of the Apprendi ruling. See, e.g., State v. Fagan, 280 Conn.
!006) (Apprendi inapplicable, but harmless error even if applicable),
08-25 (Vertefeuille, J., dissenting) (Apprendi error); State v. Rizzo,
,229 n.33 (2003); State v. Pierce, 69 Conn. App. 516 (2002) (prediffender registration requirement not sentence enhancement finding
,'endi), rev 'd on other grds., 269 Conn. 442 (2004).
o State v. Myers, 101 Conn. App. 167, cert. granted,283 Conn. 906
'rs, the Appellate Court found that it was plain error for a trial court
epeat drug offender to an enhanced penalty without a guilty plea or
tB information against him. Id. at 181-86. The case is now on review
1 the Supreme Court.
GeN. STAT. § 53a-40 (rev. 2007) covered six categories of persistent
Luthorized enhanced penalties for each, while mandating an enhanced
rtwo of the categories. Contrast use of word "shall" in Subsections (h)
e of the word "may" in Subsections (j), (k), (1)and (m). All six catepresent Apprendi problems, to the extent that each makes a sentenc,ion the critical feature that triggers availability of an enhanced senthe sentence otherwise authorized for the offense for which the defenmd convicted by a jury. The legislature in a special session in January,
the judicial opinion language in the statute that implicated Apprendi.
ecial Session, Public Act 08-01, section 7 (effective from passage).
ample, the court explained: "§ 53a-40 (h) is unconstitutional, to the
oes not provide that a defendant is entitled to have the jury make a
ng [that] expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that
he jury's guilty verdict . . . .' Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S.

ibtedlv. if the ohrase 'the court is of the opinion that' was excised.
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e genesis, and even while acknowledging that
ibrain development appears to support differenti-en the criminal responsibility of adults and young
2 the court declined to "usurp" the legislature's
iority . . . in determining the types and limits of

Lfor crimes." 83
[tial treatment of conduct as a function of the age
status of the persons involved was at the heart of
'ederal constitutional issues resolved against the
)y an unanimous, en banc panel of the Supreme
State v. McKenzie-Adams. 8 4 The defendant, a
her, challenged his conviction of thirteen counts
ssault in the second degree for engaging in con,ual intercourse with two students at his school,
ixteen years of age, normally the age of consent.
he victims' ages and consents did not spare the
zriminal liability under General Statutes section
), which proscribes sexual intercourse between
who] is a school employee and ... a person who
enrolled in a school in which the actor works or
ider the jurisdiction of the local or regional board
in which employs the actor . . . " For the court,
den rejected the defendant's facial and as-applied
to the statute predicated on a claim that he had
to engage in noncommercial consensual sexual
with individuals over the age of consent." 85 The
"We need not decide whether a fundamental right
rivacy exists generally because we agree with the
'ven if such a right exists, it does not protect sexLrt wrote: "We acknowledge the defendant's plea, acknowledge that
have more immature decision-making capability and recognize the
)rting the notion that juveniles are more vulnerable to all sorts of
ling, but not limited to, duress. The flaw with the defendant's pro-
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y in the context of an inherently coercive relationas the teacher-student relationship, wherein connot easily be refused." 86
ing that conclusion, the court looked at the princiting two United States Supreme Court's decisions
)rivacy, first, Bowers v. Hardwick8 7 in 1986, and,
!wrence v. Texas, 88 the 2003 case that overruled
1 McKenzie-Adams, the court framed the issue
Lawrence to have been "whether freely consenting
a liberty interest in intimate personal relationred in the privacy of their own home." 89 Relying
'rence court's distinction between a case involving
engaged in sexual practices "'with full and mutufrom each other"' and a case involving minors or
'ho might be injured or coerced or who are situatitionships where consent might not easily be
'90 the McKenzie-Adams court reasoned that the
sexual conduct with his students was outside the
otected private conduct recognized in Lawrence.9 1
ict scrutiny constitutionally unnecessary, the court
;rational basis test and upheld the sexual assault
ed on its rational relation to the government's
interest in promoting a safe school environ[nally, the court rejected the defendant's separate
hat "the state constitution confers a fundamental
ual privacy on an elementary or secondary schoolengage in consensual sexual intercourse with stuthe age of consent enrolled in the school system in
98-99.
S. 186 (1986).
S. 558 (2003).
zie-Adams, 281 Conn. at 504, citing Lawrence it Texas, 539 U.S. at 567.
tzie-Adams, 281 Conn. at 505-06, quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539
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eacher is employed." 9 3
:ie-Adams was also one of several cases that
view of the evidentiary principles governing the
ty of uncharged misconduct as proof of a common
plan despite the general rule that uncharged misinadmissible. 94 Issues concerning the common
plan exception arise unidirectionally when the
uncharged misconduct evidence as part of its
charged offense. Issues concerning the common
plan exception also arise, one might say, recipro*ases, such as McKenzie-Adams and State v.
5 involving consolidation of cases against a defenLngle trial. A trial court's decision to consolidate
take account whether the evidence against the
rom one case to the other is "cross admissible." 9 6
rnce is not cross admissible, fair consolidation of
ids on whether the trial court can give a cautionion to the jury adequate to to ensure that the jury
15. The court reached this conclusion by using the factorial analysis
e v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-86 (1992). Five of the Geisler fac-cedent, textual approach, Connecticut precedent, sister state prece(sociological considerations) favored the state's position. McKenzie)nn. at 510-15. The remaining factor, the historical approach, was
st of the lack of "any relevant evidence of the intent of our constituwith respect to the right of privacy." Id. at 511.
zie-Adams, 281 Conn. at 515-533 (cases brought on behalf of two
roperly consolidated where each gave evidence that would be admis-ommon plan or scheme if tried separately; uncharged misconduct
i third person also properly admitted); State v. Jacobson, 283 Conn.
007) (affirmed multiple convictions of sexual assault and risk of
d where uncharged misconduct evidence relating to a third young
ssible to show common scheme or plan; Appellate Court had previiission of the evidence to be error, but not to necessitate new trials);
ph, 284 Conn. 328, 334-68 (reversals ordered where, at consolidated
es stemming from two discrete robbery scenarios, one including a
the trial court erred in authorizing the jury to consider evidence from
liberating upon the other).
nn. 328 (2007).
Ph, 284 Conn. at 338-39 ("if evidence of a defendant's uncharged
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97
;e evidence from either case to decide the other.

Borden's opinion for the court in State v. Randolph
sizes Connecticut evidentiary doctrine governing the
ity of uncharged misconduct evidence, 98 then comainstakingly thorough analysis of the proper use of
cheme and plan evidence, with a focus on its use in
nvolving sex crimes. This effort is extraordinary, and
consistent with Borden's long history of pressing to
pon the logic, clarity, and precision with which the
governing uncharged misconduct law have been
by our reviewing courts. 9 9 Borden observes that the
me charged is a factor that changes the standard "by
admissibility of evidence of uncharged is conduct is
.]"100 A "liberal standard" applies in cases "when a
is charged with a sex crime and evidence of
sexual misconduct is offered to establish that the
had a common scheme or plan to engage in sex
By contrast, a "more stringent standard" applies in
t do not involve sex crimes." 102 Borden writes,
we have been consistent in our application of this
-andard, we have been inconsistent in our articulation
iation of the principles that guide our analysis."' 10 3
)lph, 284 Conn. at 362-63, 368 (discussing "circumstances in which
oable of assessing the merits of each case fairly and independently in
th the trial court's cautionary instructions." Id. at 362).
339-41.
Kample, in State v. Murrell, 7 Conn. App. 75, 83 (1986 ), for the
irt Judge Borden closely analyzed the functional similarities and legal
tween prior misconduct evidence offered to prove identity and such
ioffered to prove common scheme or plan. Id. at 83-84. See also State
8 Conn. 85, 132 n.35 (1991) (Borden, J.) (recognizing a "concern" in
prejudicial use of common scheme evidence to prove identity). In
en wrote that "the common scheme or system of criminal activity
,oven of several separate but related strands ...." Id. at 84. The opinsix different "strands"with the view that such "categorization" would
rfize the evidentiary risks which inhere in an otherwise mechanical test

y." Id. at 87.
lAn
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en's analysis "reveals the existence of two separate
categories of cases in which we have applied the.
ieme or plan exception." 104 His Randolph opinion
explains the two categories, the first called "true"
ieme or plan cases and the second called "'signa05

2007 the higher courts reviewed confrontation
is requiring more precise delineation of the scope
)ility of the United States Supreme Court's paraig decision in Crawford v. Washington 10 6 in
State v. Camacho,108 Justice Katz for a unani.me Court rejected the defendant's federal and
ntation challenges to the admission of testimony
,-conspirator's and dual-inculpatory exceptions to
rule.109 First, the court distinguished between
in clause analysis controlled by the Crawford test
that is "testimonial" and confrontation clause
[trolled by the pre-Crawfordtest set forth in Ohio
0 which gauges the reliability of evidence admithearsay exception."I' Finding that Roberts conie court examined the record and concluded that
ed statements were admissible under established
hearsay exceptions 1 13 and were sufficiently
1 14
to satisfy the confrontation clause.
v. Arroyo, 115 the defendant made confrontation
iis added.) Id. at 343.
3-57.
.36 (2004).
year's review, T.H. Everett, Developments In Connecticut Criminal
ONN. B. J. at 176-82 ("V: The Confrontation Clause After Crawford:
id Other Cases").
in. 328 (2007).
Z n.21 and 358.
•56 (1980).
in. at 348, 363-64.
0-51.

7, 362-63.
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lenges to the admission of videotaped testimony of
,ictim, using Jarzbek"16 procedures and the admiser testimony under the medical exception to the
e and under the constancy of accusation exception
;ay rule.1 17 Justice Borden for the court concluded
ord did not apply to the videotaped testimony
v,as "the functional equivalent of in-court testimocourt also concluded that the videotaped testimoduced pursuant to established statutory procedures
nsistent with the United States Supreme Court's
:n holding in Maryland v. Craig,119 which governs
;tances in which a witness may be examined in the
counsel and the court but outside the presence of
,nt.120 Employing the "primary purpose test" develhe United States Supreme Court in Davis v.
1121 in 2006, the Arroyo court also held that staten by the complainant to a licensed social worker
1 interviewer while being observed and taped by
ement personnel did not constitute "testimonial
under Crawford: "the primary purpose of the
was not to build a case against the defendant, but
the victim with assistance in the form of medical
23
health treatment."]'
r, the Supreme Court in Arroyo ordered a new trial
sexual assault and risk of injury counts, holding
al court had committed reversible error when it
defendant's request for a jury charge on his "third
ibility defense."' 12 4 The court denied the defenr claims of error, including a claim that the fivectim's statements given after a formal complaint
€ been filed were admitted in violation of estabi20-21. See State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, cert. denied, 484 U.S.
id CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g.
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tancy of accusation law,12 5 and a couple of other
is that may command different results if raised in
on different records. 126
v. Moore, 127 the Appellate Court found that the
right of confrontation was violated, requiring a
vhere a state's witness who had altered his testibsolved the defendant on cross-examination, then
testimony on redirect before invoking his Fifth
.tprivilege and refusing any further redirect exampreventing recross-examination. 12 8 The trial court
defendant's motion to strike the redirect testimoAppellate Court found that ruling violated the
right of confrontation, which guarantees the right
n new matters raised on redirect.129 The Appellate
ed harmless error analysis but found that the error
mless.1 30
16-40. In State v. Samuels, 273 Conn. 541 (2005), the court held that
ide by a victim after he or she had filed an official complaint with the
Jmissible as constancy of accusation evidence."' Arroyo, 284 Conn.
ting State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 541 (2007)). In
rt held that the history and purpose of Samuels rule "persuade us that
:riggered when the declarant is a young child, as in the present case,
cy, rather than the child's parent or guardian, makes an official comice on behalf of the victim." Id. at 639.
'endant claimed that the trial court "failed to inform the defendant of
Dnsular notification under the Vienna Convention of Consular
it 601. The Supreme Court declined to address the claim as briefed.
Fhe defendant also claimed that the trial court failed to conduct an
y "into his complaints that he could not communicate adequately
anish-speaking attorney" Id. at 640. While the reviewing court found
inquiry to have been adequate, the court makes an interesting point
cord under review: "Although the defendant several times requested
.ing attorney, he never claimed that the interpreter services that were
i were inadequate." /d. at 644. Monolingual English-speaking trial
idges face a special challenge as guardians of the fair trial rights of
ants who need interpreters because they are competent linguisticalnative language, not English. Attorneys must develop strategies to
services effectively and to recognize and challenge, where approaacy of interpreters' services that are not effective for a given client.
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ises raised "structural" constitutional claims relatfirst principles of criminal procedure. In State v.
ustice Palmer for the Supreme Court rejected the
claim that his constitutional right to be present at
al was violated when he was, at his own request,
om the courtroom during his murder trial and again
he was not permitted to return to the courtroom
a violent outburst and other confrontational behavmarshals holding him outside the courtroom after
Loved. 13 2 Similarly, the court found that, by his conefendant had "forfeited" his constitutional right to
iimself, which he had requested to do even as he
rig marshals removing him from the courtroom on
court in response to his own request to leave. 133
v. Strich, 134 the Appellate Court rejected the defenns that he was "removed from the courtroom in an
aanner" following his disruptive behavior and that
irt misinstructed the jury regarding the defendant's
id his absence at final arguments. 135 The Strich
nd that it was constitutional error not to inform the
Lhat he could "reclaim" his right to be present for
the trial if he gave "proper assurances" of no furtiveness, but the court found that the error implihis right to be present guaranteed by Sixth
it confrontation clause, but "only his generic fifth
t right to participate in the proceedings."' 36 That
ot call for automatic reversal, 137 but instead called
ss error analysis.13 8 The court concluded that the
armless beyond a reasonable doubt, in part because
int was given the opportunity to listen to the small
inn. 613 (2007).
36-46.
46-50.
in Ann. 611 rprt, denied_ 282 Conn. 907. cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 225
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)f the trial (the prosecutor's closing argument and
13 9
jury charge) by a closed circuit hook-up.
v. Canales,14 0 Justice Norcott for the court rejectndant's claim that it violates due process of law
to preside at a hearing in probable cause resulting
,r charge where the same judge had previously
;t and search warrants against her in the case. 141 In
kson,142 Justice Katz for the Supreme Court sus.tate's appeal from the Appellate Court which had
he trial court's instruction on the reasonable doubt
as unconstitutional because its use of the phrase
vinced.. . diluted the state's burden of proof from
reasonable doubt standard to a clear and convince standard." 14 3 The court's discussion of different
empts to define reasonable doubt, the Federal
nter's model instruction, and scholarly studies of
convinced" instruction makes for interesting
md shows how difficult it is to put an accurate and
s on a basic principle of law that is used everyday.
Llt to explain the meaning of "reasonable doubt"
sing into epistemological talk or settling for a taua disclaimer - that the reasonable doubt is what
its deeper meaning is ineffable. Concluding that
-doubt" can be defined, Justice Katz for the court
endorses1 45 an instruction adopted by the New
23.
nn. 572 (2007).
92-600. The court posited that "the question . . . is not whether the
ilure to disqualify himself constituted an abuse of discretion, but
lure resulted in a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to
. at 593-94. Agreeing that "the statutes and rules of practice evince
having a different judge reconsider previously decided questions, or
ar to those previously decided[,]" the court declared: "we strongly
our trial judges that they disqualify themselves from conducting a
hearing when they already have issued arrest or search warrants in
Id. at 599.
nn

1 1 I (11V)7
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reme Court:

.have

held that the concept of reasonable doubt is

ble, or that trial courts should not, as a matter of
provide a definition. As the foregoing discussion
s, there is no mandatory or talismanic phraseology
poken will render the instruction constitutionally
t. "[E]ven if definitions of reasonable doubt are necimperfect, the alternative-refusing to define the
at all-is not obviously preferable." Victor i
1, 511 U.S. [1,] 26 [(1994)] (Ginsberg, J., concurterefore, we encourage our trial judges to exercise
soned discretion, as did Judge Blue in the present
ashion a proper instruction. Reference to the Federal
:enter's instruction in the present case was appropriwe particularly cite with approval the New Jersey
Court's instruction attempting to improve upon that
46
deral charge. 1
1v. Phillips,147 the Appellate Court reversed the
s denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial
led for "a determination on the existing record, of
for a new trial, including a finding as to whether
acial bias on the part of a juror against the defenidge DiPentima wrote the unanimous opinion of
declaring: "Our task in this case is to strike an
Jelicate balance between preserving the sanctity of
leliberative process and ensuring that racial prejuplace in the jury room." 149 The trial court had
dentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for a
t which all six jurors in the case testified concernias on the part of a white juror toward the defene Appellate Court opinion relates that four of the
black, testified that "they believed juror B to be
ejudiced against the defendant, who is a black
ror B himself "acknowledged the racial overtones
iadjudicate its propriety in the context of the case, rather than approve
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the jury's deliberations."] 52 The trial court "found
rors' testimony to be credible" but held that there
ence that comments attributed to Juror B "'come jury in any way."' " 15 3 The Appellate Court took
the trial court's compliance with the procedural
ling the "delicate and complex task of investigatof juror bias"' 154 but took into account that that
ality is a core constitutional guarantee and that an
f juror misconduct is "all the more grave when
;said to be racial bias."' 155 The Appellate Court
d remanded for a new ruling because the trial
ruling employed the wrong legal standard: "It
instead restricted its inquiry to objective evizially related statements and behavior. The court
have decided whether that evidence amounted to
igainst the defendant on the part of one or more
ch would have automatically warranted a new
v. Fauci,157 the Supreme Court broke new ground
ly, announcing that the term "prosecutorial
'now replaces the traditional term, "prosecutorluct," as a reviewing court's denomination for
trial prosecutor that breach trial rules and imperdant's right to a fair trial. Justice Zarella opens
pinion with a lengthy footnote announcing the
'iclature, explaining the reasoning behind the
ind providing an overview of how other jurisdic!,1.

!2.
!-5.

'-3.
'5 (citing State v. Santiago, .245 Conn.301, 336 (1998)).

in. 23 (2007).
fci court makes clear that the change of terms is a formal, not a funcri the law. The new term is "more appropriate" than the old, but the
-,
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minate such claims. 159 One would expect that all
:)st obdurate defense appellate counsel will now
that allege improprieties instead of acts of mishen claiming reversible error based on rule-break;of trial prosecutors.16 0
POST-CONVICTION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

ipreme Court issued three decisions involving
,correct an illegal sentence under Practice Book
-22. In State v. Lawrence, 16 1 the court affirmed a

on of an en banc Appellate Court that had upheld
'urt's dismissal of a defendant's motion to correct
entence. The defendant's claim was that he should
convicted of and sentenced for first degree
ter instead of first degree manslaughter with a
[stice Katz for a unanimous court concluded that
vas not one over which a trial court has jurisdiction
authority to correct an illegal sentence is limited
Sgories of corrective claims recognized at common
State v. Casiano,163 a case before the Supreme
a motion to review the trial court's denial of
zounsel for an appeal from the denial of a motion
in illegal sentence, the court held that "an indigent
fendant has a right to the appointment of counsel
,y better reflects the actions of a prosecutor under [State v] Williams
23 (1987)] because the first part of our analysis looks at whether the
orosecutor are improper rather than the effects of those actions on the
trial. Id., 540. If these actions do, in fact, so infect the trial with
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process, they rise to
mful impropriety." Id. at 26 n.2.
6-28 n.2.
er, the nature of language being what it is, there may come a day in
ihen a generation of cases alleging prosecutorial "impropriety" will
the benign aspect that term now presents (not yet having been wield/ocates), and when the word "misconduct" will have been rested long
, lost its rt1rrent neiorative

onnnotntinn nnd tn he nne

na
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tation in connection with a motion under Practice
65
n 43-22." 164 The right to counsel is statutory
it the trial level and extends to the appellate level
nitially appointed counsel determines that "the
ho wishes to file such a motion has a sound basis
"166

;e discussed earlier in this article, Orcutt v.
er, 16 7 the petitioner successfully employed a
a writ of habeas corpus to enforce the terms of a
ent (a "Santobello claim"16 8). On appeal the state
the claim should not have been reached by the
t because such claims properly must be brought
on to correct an illegal sentence or on direct
The petitioner had attempted to file a pro se
orrect an illegal sentence, but there was no evi17 0
t was ever received by the clerk of the court.
upreme Court affirmed the habeas court's conie merits, it did make clear that it agreed with the
-notion to correct an illegal sentence "is a proper
i Santobello claim" 17 1 and that failure to pursue
(or an appeal) would be a procedural default barcorpus save for the "highly unsual circumUrcutt. 172
v. Commissioner,173 the hands of time had to be
and the clock rewound in a case reminiscent of
nt time-bending case, State v. Skakel.174 In Mead,
7.
;EN. STAT. § 51-296(a).
,282 Conn. at 627-28.
n. 724 (2007).
obello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
in.

at 737.

2.
;is in original.) Id. at 738 n.25.
0. The court noted that "the factual scenario of this case is highly
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ner challenged the respondent's calculation of his
three concurrent sentences of "life" for three acts
gree murder committed on or about August 12,
en the petitioner committed his offenses, "life"
prisonment for the duration of the defendant's nat175 The respondent later recalculated petitioner's
)ased upon a 1980 Public Act regarding indeterminces for "any felony committed prior to July 1,
J the petitioner has since been serving a sentence
17 6
-year minimum and with life as its maximum.
ner earned statutory good time against the miniias now serving, and later was considered for, but
.role seven times.17 7 The trial habeas court denied
n in which he asserted that he was entitled to have
Lum "life" sentence converted to reflect the current
lefinition of "life" as 60 years.1 78
)ral argument and after receiving supplemental
he effect, if any, of State i Skakel, on the case, the
Court panel hearing Mead itself moved for transfer
to the Supreme Court and the motion was grantSupreme Court affirmed the habeas court, conat the current statute defining "life" "affects subYhts and, in the absence of any clear and unequivo3ion by the legislature rebutting the presumption of
e application, that the statute does not apply
ly to persons sentenced prior to its enactment."1 80
:ing dictum at the end of Mead, Justice Sullivan
a 1989 Second Circuit decision supports the propothe petitioner's sentence should never have been
into an indeterminate sentence at all.' 8' Because
4 (Memorandum of Decision per Karazin, J. (35pp.)). Also, on

2007 Skakel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
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nt was presented only in the petitioner's suppleF "to which the respondent had no opportunity to
and because the petitioner did not claim that he
er any deleterious effect" by serving the recalcuce, the Mead court left the judgment intact.18 3
IV.

ADEQUACY OF RECORD

ber of 2007 cases, the Supreme Court faulted the
r failing to provide an adequate record for review.
he court drew an inference in favor of the petilee's position on procedural default even though
court decision under review only implicitly had
petitioner. 184 Ambiguity in the habeas decision
d against the respondent-appellee: "Having failed
rticulation by the habeas court on the issue of promlt, the respondent cannot now complain that the
;not contain an express finding by the habeas
hat issue." 18 5 In Dickinson v. Mullaney, the
)urt reversed the Appellate Court, concluding that
)roperly reached the merits of the petitioner's
ppeal because the habeas court record is inade*rmit any meaningful review of the petitioner's
he habeas court had not made the requisite findzusable delay [when the habeas court found the
,arred by laches]."186 The court called the lack of
inexcusable delay an "overlooked matter" in the
t's memorandum of decision and concluded that
er-appellant had failed to make the record adeview by filing a motion of articulation.1 8 7
¢,in State v. Dalzell,18 8 the Supreme Court
Appellate Court for reaching out to decide a
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1 seizure

case on legal grounds that "never had been
189
,ued or briefed by the parties before that court."
-me Court also rejected the defendant's alternate
r affirmance based on a pretextual stop argument
iot raised in the trial court and for which the trial
made no findings, leaving the record inadequate for
der State v. Golding.190
seeking remands for further development of the
zord do not fare well. In affirming the Appellate
rder that the defendant's motion to suppress be
ie Supreme Court in State v. Edman,191 found that
vas not entitled to a remand to the trial court for a
itiary hearing to augment the record, having at the
previously "relinquished the opportunity for an evihearing."' 19 2 In Taylor v. Commissioner,19 3 the
-ourt held that there was no need for the Appellate
iave ordered a remand for the habeas court make
idings on procedural default (for which the responistently pleaded and argued throughout the case),
tead to dispose of the case more efficiently in the
t's favor on other grounds. 194
e v. Fabricatore,19 5 the Supreme Court found that
showed that the defendant at trial had "expressly
715.
717-22 (discussing doctrinal tension in use of State v. Golding, 213
.9-40(1989), to review unpreserved search and seizure claims, recentin State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 55-56 (2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
7)).
.onn. 444 (2007).
465. The court had first explained: "Like the Appellate Court, we
)rd the state a second opportunity to contest the defendant's affidavit

his motion to suppress, which the trial court accepted as true and on
f court's legal determinationswere premised, given the absence of any-cord to demonstrate that the state did not acquiesce to the truth the
n " (P-mh-~i

do

Id]
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his appellate right to challenge a jury charge on
retreat where trial counsel "clearly expressed his
with that instruction" and "openly acquiesced at
97
he retreat theory upon which the case was tried. 1

